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The Messy Reality of Organised Crime Research 
 
Nafis Hanif and Mark Findlay
1
 
 
Introduction 
 
We call it a messy reality if unhelpful dualities, false dichotomies and distracting normative 
commitments compromise the role of research in understanding crime business. The paper 
describes a fresh approach to the study of crime business, unburdened of much of the 
conventional organised crime2 thinking which, we argue, has deflected a balanced 
understanding of criminal enterprise particularly in Asia. 
 
The analysis starts out by confronting and exposing the ideological motivations for dualism 
in conventional organised crime research. In order to suggest a cognitive pathway beyond 
this restrictive normative frame, it is essential to appreciate its potency and resilience. Law 
enforcement language buoyed up by popular culture representations of gangs, syndicates 
and crime bosses have become the accepted starting point for much research in the field 
(Brotherton 2008). Research from this perspective, we suggest, plays its own part in 
organised crime mystification and as such retards the critical utility of enterprise theory. 
 
Next the paper shows how distracted and distorted theorising infects research methodology 
and its conclusions. We advance an alternative relationship between theorising and method 
so that resultant analysis approach crime business as it is, and not as law enforcement 
perspectives want us to believe it to be. 
 
The paper concludes by propounding an integrated theoretical perspective without the 
distraction of duality.  Based on our field experience, we formulate and introduce the two-
napkins methodology which is a dynamic, interactive and multi-dimensional framework for 
understanding criminal enterprise. The potential transportability of the two-napkins 
methodology to ethnographic studies and researches on the sociology of organisations, 
families, discrimination will be addressed.  
 
The Foundations of Dialectical Tensions in Organised Crime Theorisation  
 
Contemporary organised crime analyses and research methodologies are replete with the 
dichotomised representations of businesses, markets and stake-holders. The functions of 
criminal enterprise are positioned along the axis of „legal‟ or „illegal‟, „functional‟ or 
„dysfunctional‟ and „orderly‟ or „disorderly‟. These dualisms have been historically 
                                                          
1
  Nafis Hanif is a doctoral scholar at the Law Faculty, University of Sydney.  Mark Findlay is the 
Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Sydney; Professor of Law, Singapore Management University; 
Professor of International Criminal Justice, University of Leeds. 
 
2  In an attempt to somewhat overcome the definitional and theoretical challenge surrounding the 
meaning, nature and conceptualisation of organised crime, we have drawn on Albanese‟s work. Albanese‟s 
(2004, p. 4) definition of organised crime is as follows: 
Organised crime is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities 
that are often in great public demand. Its continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, 
threats, monopoly control, and/or the corruption of public officials. 
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institutionalised through principal analytical frameworks in criminology like positivism, 
Merton‟s social structure and anomie paradigm, subcultural studies and the „crime control‟ 
law enforcement perspective. This section will show that dialectical theorisations conceal the 
dynamic reality of criminal networks3 and enterprises, and stunt efforts to realistically 
appreciate organised crime as business (Morselli & Giguere 2006).  
Positivists view criminal groups as necessarily „dysfunctional‟ units to be distinguished from 
the „functional‟ nature of legitimate institutions and markets. Theoretically criminal groups 
are unavoidably „dysfunctional‟ since they are founded on loose and disorderly associations 
of „criminals‟ with low intelligence and „pathological‟ personalities, being afflicted with 
biological or psychological deficiencies, and socio-pathies, differentiable from „normal‟ 
conformists (see Yablonsky 1966; Hirschi & Hindelang 1977; Herrnstein & Murray 1994). 
Criminal groups are contexts through which crime and deviance can be unreservedly 
pursued by groups of individuals with inherent psycho-social deficiencies (Wilson & 
Herrnstein 1986). Criminal organisations are theoretically devoid of ordered structure, 
rational culture, and entrepreneurial orientation.4 Positivist dichotomies prevail despite the 
absence of evidence to prove that members of criminal groups are afflicted with psycho-
social maladies that predispose them to violence more so compared to the general 
population of youth from poor areas, or that an association exists between joining a criminal 
group and low intelligence (Sánchez-Jankowski 2003). 
 
In “Social Structure and Anomie” Merton (1938, p. 676) perpetuates dialectical tensions in 
our understanding of organised crime with a taxonomy of „innovation‟/criminality and 
„conformity‟ as mutually exclusive responses to anomie. Merton‟s (1938, p. 673) anomie 
results from „overtly emphasised culturally-prescribed goals unattenuated by an equally 
intense accent on the institutional or socially-approved means for achieving those goals, 
within a social structure where individuals have differential access to institutional means to 
culturally prescribed goals‟. Individual capacity to access the institutional means to attain 
cultural goals within a particular social structure can be potentially facilitated or strained by 
a myriad of ascribed or achieved statuses. „Innovators‟/criminals adapt to anomie by 
accepting culturally prescribed goals but rejecting and substituting orthodox institutional 
means with the most expedient „innovative‟ means, including crime, to pursue cultural goals. 
Merton conceptualises innovators as „outsiders‟, whose ideology, values and group-
sanctioned behaviour constitute an inversion of mainstream, middle-class culture that is 
assumed to be uniformly accepted by conformists. 
 
Merton‟s paradigm gave birth to the theoretical foundation of subculture studies. Merton‟s 
concept of outsiders prompts the fixation of subcultural ethnographies to describe and 
analyse the culture of „innovators‟ as a unique social system that is unequivocally opposed to 
the presumably homogeneous middle-class culture embraced by „conformists‟ in the 
legitimate sector of society (Cohen 1955). Bourgois (2003, p. 8) conceptualises organised 
criminal culture as „street culture‟ that he describes as „a complex and conflicting web of 
beliefs, symbols, modes of interaction, values and ideologies that  emerge in the opposition 
to exclusion from mainstream society‟. It is a lifestyle of violence, substance abuse and 
internalized rage, with drug dealing as the material base. „Street culture‟ is an alternative 
forum employed by marginalised people as a structure of rewards, gains, profits and 
sanctions for autonomous personal dignity. The ecological approach of social disorganization 
                                                          
3
 The “criminal network” of an illegal entrepreneur refers to „all those individuals he or she encounters 
in the course of his or her criminal activities who are in a position to influence the success or failure of that 
criminal enterprise‟ (von Lampe 2001, p. 132).  
4
  „Entrepreneurial orientation refers to the processes, practices (proactiveness, risk taking behaviour and 
innovativeness) and decision-making activities used by entrepreneurs that lead to the initiation of an 
entrepreneurial enterprise‟ (Gottschalk 2009, p. 14). 
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theory cemented the rigid divide between the „illegitimate‟ and „legitimate‟ sectors of society 
(see McKenzie 1924; Park & Burgess 1924; Shaw & McKay 1942). Social disorganisation 
theory identifies poverty, racial heterogeneity, and the failure of legitimate, regulatory 
institutions (schools, businesses, policing, families), as typical traits of communities with 
high crime rates This perspective draws on social control theory to explain the salience of 
those characteristics in promoting collective crime (Shaw & McKay 1942). Organised criminal 
groups and culture are theorised as derivatives of the „subversive‟ socialisation of criminals 
within the dysfunctional, illegitimate context of society, which is assumed to be 
geographically bounded from the orderly, legitimate sector of society (Whyte 1955, p. xv). 
Separating society into a legitimate and an illegitimate sector is reinforced by the law 
enforcement assertions that the relationship between the police and organised crime groups 
is normatively and behaviourally oppositional. Werthman and Piliavin (1967, p. 75) coined 
the concept „ecological contamination‟ to encapsulate their findings that the underlying 
hostility between criminal groups and the police emerges because either occupy separate 
cultural and structural conditions which induce their different responses to, and perceptions 
of each other, and of the law. Ecological contamination contradicts recurrent qualitative 
findings that suggest a symbiotic relationship between corrupt regulators (police, politicians) 
and organised crime groups to facilitate the profitability, sustainability and expansion of 
criminal enterprises (see Sellin 1963; Ruth 1967; Ruggiero 2002). It perpetuates a 
fragmented understanding of organised crime to protect the ideological role and image of 
the police as frontline combatants against organised crime (Whish 2003, p. 454). 
Nevertheless the placement of law enforcement agents at the intersection between the 
legitimate and illegitimate spheres of society confirms the ideology, authority (and 
negotiability) of distinctive knowledge the law enforcement „voice‟ advances over more 
critical academic research assertions. This placement enables these regulators to monopolise 
and distort knowledge regarding the reality and extent of their involvement as cross-over 
agents5 in regulating criminal enterprise, facilitating the flow of illegal commodities between 
the legitimate and illegitimate sectors of society, and promoting the globalisation of criminal 
enterprise through discretionary patronage and application of the law.  
 
We will show through the case-study method described below that dualistic understandings 
promoted in conventional organised crime theorisations cumulatively results in fragmented 
and distorting research conclusions about organised criminal networks. 
 
Theory over Methodology: The Negative Repercussions of Integrating Theoretical 
Dichotomies into Qualitative Methodologies for Researching Organised Crime 
 
The dialectical understanding of collective criminality, criminal culture, markets and sectors 
of society (Edwards & Levi 2008), fosters and reinforces the validity of, single variable 
analytical frameworks. Law enforcement investigations into the organised crime problem, for 
example, are preoccupied with ascertaining whether organized crime groups are 
hierarchically structured or loose networks of criminal associates and whether their 
organisation in particular ways pose external threats to otherwise „licit‟ political-economies 
(Edwards & Levi 2008, p. 364). Subculture ethnographies, whose analytical focus is the 
identification of taxonomies to describe organised crime groups (as ethnically-based, 
indigenous or non-indigenous, hierarchically structured or networked), are concerned with 
the regularities, common patterns and distinguishing features of organised crime groups, 
                                                          
5
  Cross-over agents here corresponds to Murphy and Robinson‟s (2008, p. 502) concept of “maximizers” 
referring to „individuals who simultaneously use and incorporate legitimate and illegitimate means of 
opportunity in the pursuit of profit and/or monetary gain‟. 
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where these groups operate and in what markets (Edwards & Levi 2008, p. 366). In the 
resultant constrained research agenda the researchers‟ focus is channelled towards the 
mundane and distinctive features of illegitimate markets and sectors of society in terms of 
preconceived single variable analytical frameworks whether in terms of positivist biology, 
subculture‟s race and class or social disorganisation‟s ecology.  
 
The influence of dialectical tensions over the scope of contemporary organised crime inquiry 
and the prevalence of single variable analytical frameworks despite their limited explanatory 
power and coverage confirms the way earlier theorisations shrouds a “verstehen” 
methodology (Cohen 1980)6. The negative impact of dichotomies on verstehen 
understanding is exemplified by the law enforcement perspectives that formulate „the 
authorised account‟ of organised crime, concentrating as it does on members occupying 
lower rungs of the organised crime group.  This focus, rather than a holistic appreciation of 
all levels of the business and their key players, accommodates a prevailing law and order 
discourse at the expense of distorting the reality of crime as business. Violence, racial 
division, ethnic rivalry, organisational secrecy, mystical loyalty, and more violence typify the 
law enforcement representations of Asian crime business, and these are exemplified at the 
lower level of the organisation (Chin 1996). Yet, they are atypical of profitable crime 
business as a total enterprise.  
 
Therefore, the researcher‟s conscious or subconscious mis-interpretation of qualitative data 
because of preconceived subcultural prejudices, denies a verstehen understanding of the 
criminal network, confirmed by these compromised sampling frames. Epistemological 
discussions about the validity, objectivity and credibility of qualitative data on criminal 
networks and enterprises are typically critiques of the observational status of and knowledge 
provided by, „innovators‟/insiders of organised crime as opposed to „conformists‟/outsiders of 
organised crime7.  „Insiders‟ of organised crime, referring to members of organised crime 
groups, are assumed to (1) monopolise access to knowledge of various aspects of organised 
crime and (2) be endowed with special insight into matters necessarily obscure to others, 
thus possessed of a penetrating discernment. Merton (1972) defines the insider–outsider 
position as an epistemological principle centred on the issue of access and whether insiders 
of organised crime/innovators can provide a unique perspective that can never be 
penetrated by an outside/conformist participant observer. The covert nature of organised 
criminal groups, activities, networks, markets and businesses induces researchers to assume 
that only members of organised crime groups can provide intimate or insider knowledge of 
organised crime. 
 
By depending on the perspective of overly accessible marginal members in the business 
network, such „pigeon-hole sampling‟ creates stylised and alien market perspectives of 
criminal enterprise that co-incidentally confirm the insider/outside, legitimate/illegitimate 
divide, but only as an ideological rather than a methodological tool. Researchers who adopt 
a pigeon-hole sampling wrongly claim the self-sufficiency of the „insider‟ perspective for 
understanding collective criminality, criminal network and enterprises. Such a claim ignores 
qualitative evidence that „insiders‟ within a particular criminal organisation do not constitute 
a homogenous category and their knowledge of the intricacies of criminal networks and the 
operationalisation of criminal enterprise is fragmented and relative to the position they 
                                                          
6
  Weber‟s (1968) “verstehen” relates to the belief that there is objectively knowable meaning behind 
human action and interaction and functions as a directive to achieve insight into the social components of the 
participant‟s interpretative framework and perceptual processes. 
 
7
  Insiders refer to an individual who possesses intimate knowledge of the community and its members 
due to previous and ongoing association with that community and its members. 
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occupy within the hierarchical structure of the group (see Levitt & Venkatesh 2000; 
Venkatesh 2008). Despite the almost impossible task of gaining access to individuals 
occupying leadership roles in criminal organisations who speak with authority and not 
mystery about criminal networks and enterprises, qualitative researchers celebrate the 
insider perspective, even with only the telescoped knowledge offered by an exclusive 
population sample of typically accessible „insiders‟ like members occupying the lower rungs 
of criminal groups or leaders of petty gangs. 
 
This divide between „insider‟ and „outsider‟ in pigeon-hole sampling is challenged by the 
more holistic appreciations of criminal networks and organised crime, interactive, 
comparative and dynamic as it is revealed in our the piracy case-study. Exclusive focus on 
rank and file members of organised crime groups, condemns the representation of 
organised crime to a moralised „us-versus-them‟ narrative wherein legitimate commerce is 
the unwilling victim of criminal infiltration, long-suffering regulators are out-numbered and 
out-muscled by a foreign threat and good business is raped by a trade that has no moral 
limits. This is particularly so where racialist stereotyping constructs the engagement 
between criminology theorising and more conventional market analysis (Soudjin & Kleeman 
2009). Portrayed this way criminal enterprise is divorced from and destructive of legitimate 
commerce. Smith (1980, p. 361) argues that the institutionalisation of the dichotomy, 
business versus crime, through our terminology and statistical categories blinds us to the 
legal-illegal continuum of enterprise. 
 
Resisting Dialectical Tensions and Rectifying Methodology 
 
An important strategy we adopted in our research for resisting false dichotomies and 
resultant methodological distortion was to construct a holistic theorisation of organised 
criminal enterprise and networks, rejecting pigeon-hole sampling. This section details our 
ethnographic study of the Omega gang in the Singapore prisons, and from their 
investigating the organisation of broadcast media piracy in the Malaysian state of Kuala 
Lumpur. The methodological framework for researching organised crime can be re-imagined 
to facilitate validation, a verstehen appreciation of data and to encourage reflexivity in the 
theorising process. Our method grows from lower rank gang interrogation to incorporate the 
higher structures of knowledge governing crime syndicates doing profitable crime business. 
 
Our ethnographic study of the Omega gang in the Singapore prisons sampled both insiders 
and outsiders. We conceptualised „outsiders‟ as individuals or groups of people who had no 
interest in claiming  membership as „insiders‟ but whose interactions with „insiders‟ were 
systematic (as opposed to incidental and functional) within the specific context of crime 
business facilitation, and regulatory cross-over. The outsiders we sampled include members 
of Chinese secret societies in prison, ex-Omega members who subsequently became 
affiliated with Chinese secret societies, prison officers and guards and inmates who are 
unaffiliated with any criminal group. Insiders comprised members occupying various ranks 
within the hierarchical structure of the Omega gang. This inclusive sampling strategy 
facilitated the contextualisation of Omega‟s socio-economic status vis-à-vis established 
Chinese secret societies within Singapore society in order to: 
1) deconstruct the ideology of ethnic affiliation among „Malay-Muslims‟ as the sole 
reason for Omega‟s establishment, 
2) understand the prison context as Omega‟s stronghold for recruiting members to 
facilitate the group‟s expansion, 
3) explain why Omega members target Malay-Muslim members of Chinese secret 
societies for violent confrontations, and 
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4) investigate the incongruence between the anti-Chinese sentiment espoused by low 
ranking Omega members and the cooperative relationship Omega leaders claim to 
secure with an established Chinese syndicate in Kuala Lumpur (Hanif 2008).  
 
Interview responses from rank and file Omega members regarding the reasons underlying 
the gang‟s formation, their perception of Malay-Muslim members of Chinese secret societies, 
and the gang‟s interaction with Chinese criminal groups generally revolved around a 
racialised discourse. Omega was portrayed as an organisation that prevents the victimisation 
of Malay-Muslims from the tyranny of Chinese secret society members and induces Malay-
Muslim members of Chinese secret societies to be conscious of their socio-economic 
marginalisation vis-à-vis their Chinese counterparts (Hanif 2008, p. 2). The responses of 
these rank and file insiders reflected their status as subjects of false consciousness, whose 
solidarity to the group was a consequence of obligatory ideologies perpetrated by gang 
leaders. These gang members were largely ignorant of the extent and dynamics of criminal 
enterprise beyond their limited involvement. Alternatively, the perspective of outsiders like 
ex-Omega members who shifted their allegiance to established Chinese secret societies 
challenges Omega‟s racial and religious ideologies. The primary reasons for leaving the gang 
was cited by ex-Omega members as including the failure of Omega‟s leaders (1) to provide 
its members with any regular or significant pecuniary advantages, (2) to redress the 
unstable socio-economic status of the gang relative to established Chinese criminal 
organisations and (3) to secure a symbiotic relationship with corrupt regulators whose 
patronage will ease the regulatory sanctions over Omega members. To promote solidarity 
among Omega members and to protect the integrity of the gang where steady business 
profit is illusive or illusory, Omega‟s leaders exploit ethnic and religious affiliation among its 
lower ranked members, to further mask their ignorance of how the criminal enterprise really 
functioned, and to distract attention to away from issues of commercial vulnerability.  To 
these lower gang members it all seemed to be about race, patronage, instability and violent 
encounters. 
 
Data gathered from low-ranking members of criminal organisations, who are predisposed to 
petty conflicts as a demonstration of masculine bravado, direct confrontations with social 
control agents and inter-gang conflict at an everyday level emphasise disorder, dysfunction 
and limited understandings of an enterprise perspective. Low ranking Omega members were 
vehement in their derision of Malay Muslim members of Chinese criminal groups as „infidels‟ 
and traitors to their race, in their animosity towards the „Chinese‟ syndicate that dominates 
the piracy trade in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, and their frustration with the Chinese 
syndicate that curtails Omega‟s struggle to operate an independent criminal business. Our 
interviews with Omega leaders on the other-hand emphasised the necessity to deal with a 
socio-economically dominant Chinese syndicate in Kuala Lumpur in order to secure a 
subordinate collaborative relationship and to receive a financial slice of the piracy trade. 
Without the patronage of corrupt regulators, Omega members are subject to regulatory 
sanctions, which hinder the gang‟s orderly and organised pursuit of, and involvement in the 
media piracy, and further condemns them to low order service delivery in another network‟s 
trade. Leaders of Omega offer the Malaysian syndicate leader a portion of their profits for 
the right to market syndicate-produced pirated digital versatile discs (DVDs) throughout 
various locations like train stations, bus stations and housing estates in Singapore. The 
Malaysian syndicate leader benefits economically form the „royalty‟ paid by street-corner 
gangs who market their products within Malaysia as well as internationally. This enterprise 
structure confirms that the visible „insider‟ status and positioning of individuals is not 
synonymous with a monopolistic access to knowledge about organised criminal enterprise as 
some naive researchers assume. There is no complete understanding of the enterprise 
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without an integrated and holistic engagement with the crucial levels of its business 
structure. 
 
Two factors from our ethnographic study of the Omega gang strengthen belief in an 
inclusive sampling frame to understand the complex criminal networks that facilitate the 
profitability, sustainability and globalisation of the Malaysian broadcast media piracy trade. 
First is learning about Omega‟s function as franchisers of syndicate-produced pirated DVDs 
of Hollywood, Bollywood and Chinese blockbusters which directs us to explore the networks 
facilitating media piracy beyond the unilateral perspective of the dominant syndicate leader. 
Second is the recognition that insider knowledge regarding the organisation of the media 
piracy trade and the intricacies of criminal networks that support piracy is not uniformly 
distributed either: 
1) throughout the ranks of any particular criminal entity whether the syndicate or the 
Omega street-corner gang or  
2) among criminal entities whether the syndicate of the Omega gang within the 
illegitimate sector of society.  
Researching criminal networks based on the organisation of the media piracy enterprise 
requires a methodological inquiry into the negotiated cooperative relationships between 
groups of social actors integral to the profitability, sustainability, „orderability‟ and 
advancement of media piracy as a national, regional and international criminal enterprise. 
The profit-generating and market-sustaining potential of these relationships became 
apparent from qualitative interviews with the syndicate leader, leaders and foot soldiers of 
the Omega gang and cross-over agents including the police, custom officers and directors of 
the Malaysian Film Censorship Board (MFCB).  
 
„Outsiders‟ in the form of corrupt regulators who negotiate and interact directly and 
systematically with leaders of the syndicate and the Omega gang, but who are not members 
of these organisations per se, possess a cross-market view of crime business and what 
distinguishes the grey porous barrier of market legitimacy. The perspective of these corrupt 
regulators, as insiders depending on the aspect of the piracy business they facilitate and as 
outsiders unaffiliated with any organised crime groups, possess the capacity to illuminate 
the contextual variables necessary for the profitability and practicality of the media piracy 
enterprise, and crucially to its consumer persistence and normalcy. The insights offered by a 
couple MFCB directors focused our inquiry into the syndicate leader‟s strategies to ensure 
the marketability of syndicate-produced pirated DVDs over legitimate products and the 
burgeoning pirated DVD market operated by individuals and criminal groups, to the 
satisfaction of normalised consumer demands8. The process of negotiating the interests of 
the directors of MFCB in order to obtain original copies of new film releases is of paramount 
importance to the syndicate leader, in ensuring a lucrative enterprise of piracy, through a 
loyal and recurrent consumer market. Following an acceptance of a financial settlement from 
the syndicate leader, corrupt police officials exercise their cooperative and facilitative role in 
the piracy venture by executing the following tasks:  
 to overlook the illicit relationship between the syndicate leaders and the directors of 
the MFCB, which facilitates the enterprise of piracy and violates copyright law,  
 to exploit their rank, status and authority to eliminate potential disruptions posed by 
other criminal entities that attempt to subvert the arrangement among the syndicate, 
directors of the film censorship board and the police.   
                                                          
8
  The MFCB directors elaborated that the production of high quality pirated DVDs, marked by visual 
and sound clarity, is systematically achievable only by duplicating original copies of new films released to the 
MFCB, a ministry of the Malaysian government in charge of vetting all films. 
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The crime boss in turn deals with the politicians and senior regulators crucial for the profit of 
his trade as might any legitimate businessman.9 His capacity for seamless cross over 
between the transaction of social and commercial legitimacy is indicative of his status in the 
„two societies‟ and the eventual normalcy of this crime business. 
 
Our qualitative investigation into the enterprise of broadcast media piracy revealed that the 
profitability, sustainability and globalisation of the market-oriented media piracy trade are 
dependent on the illicit negotiations prompted by the syndicate leader to bring about the 
following: 
1) the corruptibility of regulators like Malaysian police, politicians, custom officers and 
the Film Censorship Board to enhance consumer satisfaction and syndicate 
dominance over the piracy trade, 
2) consumer normalisation of the illegitimacy of selling, distributing and consuming 
pirated DVDs as a global enterprise on the basis of prevalence, convenience and 
price-sensitivity, and 
3) the collaboration of the Omega street-corner gang as franchisers of the syndicate-
produced pirated DVDs in neighbouring countries like Singapore and Thailand. 
Participants in the media piracy network cross-over boundaries of class, race, gang 
membership, and bridge the legitimate and illegitimate commercial and political sectors of 
society to establish a collaborative relationship by negotiating their asymmetrical social 
capital, according to a conventional commercial cost-benefit analysis. Contrary to the 
violence and disorder that typically characterise descriptions of Asian organised crime, the 
narrative of Omega leaders exposes the ordered and functional organisation of the 
illegitimate Malaysian markets for the sale and distribution of pirated materials. While 
Omega‟s rank and file celebrate violence and intimidation, in network reality these ways of 
doing business are seen as disorderly and are disvalued and discouraged at the decision-
making end of the enterprise. Data gathered from the syndicate leader reveals dynamic 
negotiations to be the primary mode of conflict resolution among key players within the 
enterprise of piracy to protect the stability of criminal business. 
  
During participant observation in nightclubs owned by the syndicate leader, we witnesses 
the commercial interaction between the syndicate leader, Omega‟s leaders and corrupt 
regulators, both the police and a few directors of the MFCB, and were also able to engage 
them in informal conversation to gain insight into their negotiated collaboration with the 
syndicate leader. The similarities between this and any normal trade negotiation in the 
legitimate market were remarkable. 
 
The ‘Two Napkins’ Methodology: Defeating and Adapting Duality 
 
The need to manage distracting duality about crime business as essentially disorderly and 
confrontational is a strong argument for developing a multi-variant and comparative 
research methodology with capacity to interrogate crucial sites to reflect the internal 
organisation of criminal enterprise. Such a comparative research frame requires viewing 
crime business from cross-over agency perspectives to the extent that non-member  
maximisers comfortably make the switch without/within to facilitate profitability and market 
share.   
 
                                                          
9
  This ‘cross-over’ is harder to distinguish when political patronage and public sector corruption is a 
common feature of doing any profitable business in Malaysia. 
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What is the significance of „napkin‟10 imagery within this theoretical model? As a typically 
large rectangular cloth that is folded lengthwise or breadth-wise into a series of smaller 
rectangular flaps the napkin offers a variety of interconnected and overlapping research 
contexts. The process of folding the large rectangle cloth into smaller rectangle flaps creates 
pressed boundaries that distinguish one flap from another and which are imprinted on the 
cloth. The larger rectangular cloth and the series of rectangle flaps that are shaped from the 
cloth through the folding process is analogous with interactive research fields.  One napkin 
is a patchwork of integrated segments (which could be seen as individual research variants) 
requiring cross-over and interconnection for the purposes of the napkin to be understood.  A 
three dimensional approach is offered when two napkins are juxtaposed and here symbolise 
say the gang structure and then the syndicate.  
 
Within the two-napkin methodology each large rectangle cloth represents the structure 
terrain and context of a particular group of social actors, legitimate or illegitimate. These 
boundaries are traversable but at the same time determine the appearance and purpose of 
the cloth. In the case of piracy each rectangle cloth could represent the entire structure of 
the syndicate, the Omega gang, or the entire ranks of cross-over agents (police, custom 
officers, and personnel from the Malaysian Film Censorship Board). Each smaller rectangle 
flap within the large rectangle cloth represents various perspectives (or variants in method 
terms) of the enterprise dynamic, whether race, gender, language, class, biology, business 
type, rank, etc  through which a researcher may interpret and analyse the actions of social 
actors within a particular community (or its enterprise). For the purposes of our piracy 
research, one large rectangle napkin represents the Omega gang. As we have seen in the 
above section, qualitative interviews with members occupying the rank and file positions 
within the gang‟s hierarchy reveal the salience of race and religion to explain the limits of 
their collective behaviour and how they view it. Interviews with Omega leaders reveal the 
wider commercial enterprise characteristics and individual market conditions such as 
consumer preference, supply assurance, access, and price sensitivity, to explain their actions 
(e.g. their negotiations with the syndicate leader to assume a subordinate role in the piracy 
trade by franchising syndicate-produced DVDs in Singapore). In the case of the large 
rectangle cloth representing the Omega gang, the smaller rectangle folds would then 
become the analytical tools such as race, gender, religion and enterprise to explain the 
collective behaviour of Omega members occupying various ranks throughout the gang‟s 
hierarchical organisation.  
  
The various flaps within a single napkin are dependent on what surround them in that 
different perspectives may be most applicable in making sense of the discourses and the 
lived realities of members occupying various ranks within a particular group or community. 
The comparative dimension, flap to flap and napkin on napkin transcends a single research 
space or a single group, occupation, or subculture under investigation. Where the method 
achieves its true capacity is micro to macro comparison. Criminal enterprise is neither single 
layered nor bi-lateral. Business analysis demands a multi-dimensional frame, and one which 
follows the dynamic of business relationships of power and dependency.  
 
Any attempt to understand the organisation of criminal or legitimate business must focus on 
at least two groups of dynamically interacting social actors, communities or enterprise 
frames. Ethnographies of particular criminal entities make little sense without including a 
second napkin. Comparative possibilities include: 
 analysing inter-gang relations,  
                                                          
10
  Inspiration comes in strange situations and over coffee is not uncommon. The use of napkins as an 
analogy is purely incidental as the authors happened to be engaged in a conversation at the recently demolished 
BB‟s Café in the University of Sydney Union, when this methodological framework was born. 
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 the interaction between a criminal organisation and the community of which it is a 
part,  
 parts of the business to each other,  
 service gangs and umbrella syndicates,  
 business to the consumer, and  
 a criminal organisation to law enforcement agents, and the markets they regulate.  
Social control perspectives are distracting and distorted without advancing an analysis of the 
interaction between discretionary law enforcement and its impact on criminal entities. 
Subculture studies are premised on two napkins since criminal culture is often compared or 
juxtaposed with dominant market culture.  However, conventionally such analysis tends to 
stop at bi-lateral comparison. Any attempt to unravel the chain of a criminal network that 
facilitate criminal business and to theorise organised crime begins with an analysis of at 
least two communities in interaction with one another.  
 
Something resembling the two-napkin interactive and comparative methodology is 
indispensable in a context where the research attempts to grasp the dynamic interaction 
among groups of social actors who cooperate in the interest of facilitating criminal 
enterprises or any other ancillary venture (legitimate business, political campaigns), the 
nature of that cooperation, its basis and how it is established. Our work envisages criminal 
enterprise as an interactive, integrated and dynamic field of commercial relationships and 
arrangements. This field flows across a range of regulatory situations and „boundaries of 
permission‟. The resultant crime opportunities in a business sense are as a consequence, 
adaptable to the conditions of market profit as may be any legitimate commercial 
endeavour. They need to be researched as such. At the risk of simply hinting at the 
dimensions of a comparative aspirations for enterprise theory they are these: 
 Within the context of the gang and the syndicate it is crucial to employ two napkins 
methodology, breaking free of a single variant, mono-perspective analytical tool, 
whether race, gender, class, religion, to research the emergence, organisation, 
legitimacy and authority of a particular criminal entity;  
 In our analysis between the syndicate and the Omega gang at the meso level, two 
napkins methodology isolates the analytical tools that explain the motivation of the 
Omega gang to negotiate a subordinate position to the syndicate, the reason for the 
syndicate allowing the Omega gang to franchise its DVDs, and the way this 
relationship of dependency leads to essential service delivery and facilitation, 
determines power relations, defining the organisational structure of each criminal 
entity; 
 Analysing the interaction between syndicate leaders and corrupt regulators at the 
macro level, two napkins methodology illuminates the way the regulatory market 
frames are negotiated and utilised for individual and collective benefit, as well as for 
determining and certifying market boundary meanings; 
 Two napkins methodology enables a comparison between legitimate enterprise and 
criminal business, specifically the commercial interests and arrangements that 
eventuate in a profitable crime business and its proliferation/perpetuation in order to 
dissolve stylised representations of criminal business as disorderly and dysfunctional 
(antithetical to legitimate business).  
 Across complementary business enterprises, recognising particularly in market 
positioning and capital sourcing in trade relations, enterprises (legitimate and 
illegitimate) collaborate and complete.  Where do illegitimate arrangements form the 
linkages for these relations? 
 Two napkins method dissolves the insider/outsider dichotomy that has typically 
plagued the sampling process, repositioning the epistemological debate surrounding 
the validity, credibility and objectivity of insider versus outsider data, and moving on 
11 
 
to a new methodological consideration of the research mission with cross-over at its 
centre. 
 
Distinguishing between illegitimate and legitimate market representation is not the reason 
for or the reality of the two napkins analysis.  An interrogation of the way that the flaps 
inter-relate, and then how the different communities negotiate their business interests and 
positioning, denies a rigid duality based on simple regulatory or normative identity and 
distinction.  Looking back from the voice of cross-over agents shows how it is the 
interleaving and layering of the napkins into a multi-levelled interactive methodology that 
the confusions of past research methods fall away. Finally, the masking function of duality-
based research is implicit in napkin on napkin, without searching out the interactive 
dynamics of the flaps to the total cloth. 
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